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THE LATE-MODERN FUTURE OF
A SWITCH-HITTING JUVENILE COURT:
WHERE DID IT COME FROM? WHAT IS IT?
AND HOW WILL WE KNOW WHEN IT ARRIVES?t
SIMON I. SINGER*

INTRODUCTION

The contemporary juvenile court can no longer be viewed as
the tightly focused regulative court that its late-nineteenth century reformers once envisioned.' It is not the tightly coupled
coordinating court of jurisdiction that its creators once hoped
for when arranging for the treatment or dispositions of delinquent youths. Instead, it has become just one legal setting in a
multitude of treatment and justice systems. For many juveniles
charged with the least serious of offenses, the juvenile court is to
be avoided. Instead, diversion into a set of treatment-oriented
programs has created the "soft-end" of juvenile justice. For
juveniles who are charged with serious violent offenses or have a
history of chronic delinquency, the criminal court has become
the center of judicial decision making, sentencing, and criminal
punishment. While the "hard-end" in the shape of a public criminal court and a public criminal record is clearly visible, the softend is not, and the juvenile court has become just one of many
possibilities in increasingly bureaucratic systems of juvenile
justice. 2
t
On November 7, 2007, the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public
Policy hosted a panel discussion entitled, "Lost Innocence: Hope and Punish-

ment in the Juvenile Justice System." Professor Singer's remarks have been
revised for publication.
* Professor at the College of Criminal Justice, Northeastern University;
Ph.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1980.

1. For the most recent account of the original goals of the juvenile justice
(2004). An
earlier historical account that should be noted as presenting an image of a
tightly focused juvenile court is contained in the words and experience ofJudge
Ben Lindsey. See Paul Colomy & Martin Kretzmann, Projects and Institution Building: Judge Ben B. Lindsey and the Juvenile Court Movement, 42 Soc. PROBS. 191
(1995); see also MURRAY LEVINE & ADELINE LEVINE, HELPING CHILDREN 115-141
(1992).
2. My reference to the soft- and hard-ends of our justice systems draws on
terms introduced in STANLEY COHEN, VISIONS OF SOCIAL CONTROL 232-33
(1985).
system, see DAVID S. TANENHAUS, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE MAKING
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Why is the juvenile court no longer the coordinating court
ofjurisdiction for many juveniles in the juvenile justice system? Is
there actually a system of juvenile justice or are there too many
systems to have a single court to coordinate both its treatment
and punishment objectives? How can we think about a juvenile
court that meets the best interests of society in responding to
delinquency and preventing delinquents from becoming adult
offenders? The answer that I will present is not to eliminate the
juvenile court, but to revise the way that we think about its ability
to function in a complex modern society. I will draw on the term
"modernity" to suggest complexity in the the current state of
juvenile courts. My reading of the history ofjuvenile justice is not
only informed by a theory of modernity, but also by a theory of
complex organizations in a post-industrial modern society.'
Modernity may be defined by specific time periods in
America's past industrialization and its current high-tech information and service economies. My objective is not simply to
review history in light of contemporary social theories of modernity, but to recommend a way of thinking about juvenile justice
that is not that far removed from the way we have always thought
about a singular system of treatment and punishment. I will draw
on the idea of a juvenile court that is able to combine regulative
and the normative objectives in a single coordinating court of
jurisdiction. I use the term "a switch-hitting juvenile court" to
represent a court that is both regulative and normative in its ability to emphasize safety and control. Several coordinating features
of a switch-hitting juvenile court draw on the contemporary literature on complex organizations and focus on transparency and
tight-coupling. A switch-hitting juvenile court repeats the contemporary language of modernity.
But before proceeding, consider briefly the current state of
juvenile justice. First, there is more than one system of juvenile
justice to consider. Second, these systems persist not necessarily
because they have been proven to meet their stated objectives.
Rather, they are often there to provide an impression of doing
something about juvenile crime or delinquency. They fall into
the political range of interests and concerns, ideas that are worth
pursuing in the wake of public calls to do something about juvenile delinquents. Third, systems ofjuvenile justice may be considered either exclusionary or inclusionary in their efforts to treat
and to punish. The inclusionary is less stigmatizing and allows
3. See ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY (1990) for a
theory relevant to understanding the late-modern as opposed to the industrialmodern world.
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youths to become adults without a disenfranchising record. They
may move on in their educational and occupational pursuits.
However, I will suggest that inclusionary forms of justice are
often less satisfying than penalties that exclude.
Sentencing juveniles to criminal court or isolating them in a
prison is exclusionary, visible, and often most satisfying to the
public. The state of inclusionary forms of juvenile justice is not
only less visible, but also fleeting, and frequently entails doing
virtually nothing to provide treatment for troubled youths, such
as when probation officers are much too busy to spend time
counseling youths. But there are other forms of soft-end diversions that yield little proof of success. These include juvenile
drug courts, teen or peer courts, and even therapeutic schools
just to name a few of many possibilities.4 Juveniles often enter
these soft-end treatment programs because if they fail to do so
they can face punishment in juvenile court. Similarly, failing to
conform to the requirements ofjuvenile court can lead to criminal court. This too is juvenile justice, as some youths commonly
thought of as under the age of majority are eligible for criminal
court. The assumption held by states which provide hard-end justice for juveniles is that if they are old enough to commit a violent act, then they are old enough to serve the adult form of
punishment. But this exclusionary form of punishment is with a
background of inclusionary sanctions so that a segment of
juveniles are deemed as lacking adult criminal responsibility.
The issue of adult legal responsibilities is at the heart of both
the soft- and hard-ends of juvenile justice systems. The U.S.
Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons acknowledged the need for
juvenile justice when it disallowed a state court's sentence of a
seventeen-year-old to death.5 In the opinion of the majority of
justices, seventeen-year-olds have a diminished sense of adult
responsibility.6 The justices cited research in developmental psychology that shows adolescents are less rational and more impulsive than adults. 7 Not surprisingly, they agreed that juveniles are
not as mature as adults. The justices also cited evolving standards
of decency.8 For example, the vast majority of developed nation4.

For discussion of some of these soft-end diversions, see, e.g.,

DRUG COURTS AND TEEN SUBSTANCE ABUSE

JUVENILE

(Jeffrey A. Butts &John Roman eds.,

2004); Simon I. Singer, Criminal and Teen Courts as Loosely Coupled Systems ofjuve-

nileJustice, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 509 (1998).
5. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005).
6. Id. at 569.
7.

Id.

8.

Id. at 564-67.
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states no longer execute their juveniles.9 This again is no surprise
in the sense that the modern nation-state is a civilized state. Still
the Supreme Court maintained the right of states to prosecute
and convict juveniles as if they were adults. Roper v. Simmons is
only concerned with the ultimate penalty of death as it might be
applied to juveniles under the age of eighteen.1"
Essentially, the Supreme Court reiterated only one aspect of
the past that affirmed that adolescents are socially and legally distinguishable from adults, and ignored that aspect of history recognizing the juvenile court as the only court of jurisdiction for
the punishment of juveniles. It left open the door to criminal
court and life without the possibility of parole, while denying the
significant age-specific reason for a juvenile court. The Supreme
Court allowed the current bureaucratization ofjuvenile justice to
persist in its divisions between treatment and punishment injuvenile or criminal court.
In presenting a late modern vision of a switch-hitting juvenile court, I wish to limit the current bureaucratization of juvenile justice.1 The regulative and normative concerns with safety
and control will not be satisfied by a continued expansion of the
soft- and hard-ends of our justice systems. Instead I will suggest
that juvenile justice requires first an acknowledgment of its regulative and normative roots and the ways that it can function to
meet the demands of an increasingly complex society. Both the
regulative and normative functions of law can be considered in a
reinvigorated juvenile court that is able to coordinate both its
soft- and hard-ends in a single system ofjustice. This would mean
eliminating criminal court for juveniles, while addressing the
normative concerns of a society that requires a segment of its
delinquents punished. Similarly, it would also require at the soft
end of juvenile justice systems, the elimination of drug and teen
courts as separate courts of jurisdiction, although the services
and treatments that they offer would be provided by coordinating the regulative aspects of a juvenile court. The regulative mission of the juvenile court should be maintained with soft-end
treatment, and the normative mission with hard-end sanctions.
9. See id. at 577.
10. Id. at 568-69.
11. The term "bureaucratization" describes not only complex organizations that are ritualistic but also those that seem to have endless divisions of
labor that serve no specific purpose. For an excellent review of the many images
or frames of complex organizations, particularly as they relate to the business
world, see generally LEE G. BOLMAN & TERRENCE E. DEAL, REFRAMING ORGANIZATIONS (1991); GARETH MORGAN, IMAGES OF ORGANIZATION (2d ed. 1997).
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To picture the regulative and normative missions of a reinvigorated juvenile court is not an easy task, and my argument is
mainly theoretical. The idea of a switch-hitting juvenile court still
needs to be developed along with the regulative and normative
functions of juvenile justice. For now I will emphasize the need
for organizational transparency and tight-coupling in the administration ofjustice. To make the theoretical argument I draw on a
metaphor based on the switch-hitting batter in the game of baseball. Switch hitters are able to draw on their ambidextrous skills
to improve the odds of getting a hit. They are able to shift their
batting stance from left to right, according to the throwing direction of a pitch. A left-handed pitcher will usually cause a switch
hitter to bat from the left, while a right-handed pitcher from the
right. Managers often call on their switch hitters to pinch hit
when there is a change in pitchers. A switch-hitting juvenile court
would similarly be able to confront a variety of youths and adolescents; those who can throw the unexpected curves that lead to a
serious response. It would be prepared to provide soft-end and
first resort treatment-oriented options, but also hard-end and last
resort penalties. This soft-end focuses on the regulative mission
of the juvenile court, while the hard-end is concerned with the
normative.
The words "regulative" and "normative" in the social control
literature have come to take on meanings that are often interchangeable. The normative is a derivation of the word norm, and
suggests the primacy of the group. Normative behavior is behavior that conforms to the group. The group may be defined as a
group of friends, community, neighborhood, village, or society.
Legal norms are codified and reflect criminal, civil, or administrative laws. Social norms are not necessarily codified and are
associated with particular groups. The normative aspects of life
are particularly clear when there is considerable overlap with
social and legal norms. There may be deviation from the group,
but that deviation is easily recognized and acknowledged. In
terms of understanding the forces of social control, there is little
need to go beyond a single group.
But modern societies cannot easily box their members into a
single group, neighborhood, community, or society. The definition of modern societies is one that consists of a variety of
groups, neighborhoods, and communities. In the sociological
literature, such terms as "pluralistic," "heterogeneous," and "subcultural" are cited to describe the fact that modern societies are
not composed of a single normative group. Instead there are pastiches of groups, neighborhoods, and communities to consider
each with its own ways of behaving that are difficult if not impos-
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sible to describe in a purely normative sense of the word. In
terms of delinquency and crime, the social norms of a violent
gang are obviously in conflict with the legal norms of society.
Similarly, what is normative for adolescents is not for adults. The
bottom line in the normative view of understanding human
behavior is that an identifiable group defines the deviant, delinquent, or criminal. Clearly certain norms, such as "thou shalt not
kill," are clearly normative and universal, although they are too
subject to debate as in a trial when act of killing is defined as act
of murder as opposed to act of defense.
But for the less serious category of offenses that are often
relegated to concerns about the values of a society, such as the
value placed on school attendance and underage alcohol consumption, the regulative comes into play. The word "regulative"
is rooted in the idea of an object to be controlled or a principle
to be pursued. It is not clearly defined in the context of a specific
group. While the normative excludes (you are either part of the
group or not), the regulative advocates, such as for the regulation of safety. In the complex world of social control, the regulative is oriented towards the principle of risk management. 12 To
regulate is not only to manage, but also to acknowledge deviance
and the risks of things going wrong. For instance, parents typically regulate the behavior of their children. They regulate generally with several principles in mind. One principle that would
reflect their view on delinquency and overlaps with a traditional
juvenile court is the idea of regulating safety. A lot of child rearing is centered on maintaining the safety and health of the child
as he or she matures from childhood to adolescence.
Modern societies and their governments are also in the business of regulating safety, and this comes in the form of regulating
crime. This is one aspect of the American progressive agenda
that was first introduced in the nineteenth century. Juvenile justice was to fit the regulative mission of a modern-day society. It
differed from the exclusionary object of normative control; it was
less about identifying the deviant in the community and sanctioning his or her behavior and more about avoiding the continued
risk of trouble. It was about regulating safety just as a physician
would regulate a temperature that was marked to be much too
high.

12.

The late-modernity argument of regulative risks is represented in Mal-

colm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 Criminology 449 (1992). This article has

become a classic in its emphasis on correctional strategies as risk assessments.
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In advocating a switch-hitting juvenile court, I will suggest a
court that is able to integrate its regulative mission of safety and
society's demand for normative control. It is a way of thinking
beyond the notion that social welfare and social control objectives are mutually exclusive and oppositional.13 To make the case
for a switch-hitting juvenile court I not only draw on theories of
modernity, but also on research literature that repeatedly shows
a multitude of complex organizational goals and interests. The
simple paradigm of a single normative system of control 1makes
4
little sense in the wake of the current late-modern world.
PURPOSE

To lend order to the multitude of ideas that relate to this
paper, I begin by first discussing early industrial modernity's
attempt at juvenile justice. I expand on the point that the nineteenth century is the period when America's progressive reformers advocated social institutions that reinforced the age-specific
stage of life that would come to be known as adolescence. I suggest that industrialization socially extended the dependency of
childhood into late adolescence, and that this basic fact had
implications for the coordinating objectives of several progressive
institutions. The most notable in the progressive agenda is compulsory school attendance and the passage of child labor laws.
Houses of refuge, reformatories, probation, and then juvenile
courts can be viewed as one set of progressive reforms to regulate
the lives of its youth. But in reviewing the development of ajuvenile court, I will note the inability of late-nineteenth-century
advocates of juvenile justice to take into account the normative
need to see the offender punished.
The second part of this paper expands the critique of a
traditional juvenile court by drawing on the due process requirements of the Supreme Court as mandated in the Kent15 and
Gault6 decisions. I draw on a theory of modernity and organization to suggest that the court advocated bifurcating systems of
justice. Without the coordinating features of a court of jurisdic13.

See generally BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION
287-330 (1999).
14. Although I make this distinction between the normative and regulative aspects of the social, legal, and administrative, most sociological and organizational theorists do not.
15. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966) (holding the transfer
of juveniles to adult court must comply with required procedures).
16. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1967) (holding ajuvenile court adjudication is subject to the Due Process requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
OF JUVENILE COURT
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tion, the contemporary post-Gaultjuvenile court began to loosen
its legal jurisdiction. I relate bifurcating systems of juvenile justice to modern-day complexity, expert systems of knowledge, and
the absence of a localized sense of place. I suggest that these are
processes of modernity, and they have contributed to the current
endless splitting of juvenile justice.
In the third part of this paper, I extend late-modernity theory to suggest the parameters of a switch-hitting juvenile court. I
emphasize its regulative and normative functions within the context ofjudicial leadership and a tightly-coordinated and transparent system of juvenile justice. The regulative and normative
functions of a juvenile court, I further suggest, produce disparities in our systems ofjuvenile justice. For youths living in affluent
suburban cities, the regulative features ofjuvenile justice provide
treatment through diversion. For those who reside in the impoverished inner cities, the juvenile court has become less treatment-oriented, lacking any of the services that might be available
in more affluent suburbs. Instead, a hard-end of juvenile justice
exists often with transfer to criminal court, creating increased
disparities in the sentencing of troubled youths. I conclude by
suggesting that a more visible and tightly coordinated juvenile
court would reduce disparities in juvenile justice and provide the
legal rules that could prevent states from having to punish their
juveniles as if they were adults.

I.

INDUSTRIAL MODERNITY AND THE
CREATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT

May those that love us, love us.
And those that don't love us,
May God turn their hearts.
And if He doesn't turn their hearts,
May He turn their ankles
17
So we will know them by their limping.
The time has long passed when the turning of ankles could
be considered appropriate ways of identifying the deviant. The
turning of ankles by today's standards is considered cruel and
unusual punishment. But in pre-modern times, this physical side
of punishment served several important functions. First, it clearly
marked the offender, creating the visible stigma that distinguished the individual from the group or community. Knowing
the offender and being able to watch over the offender is important as stated in the concluding line of the above Irish blessing.
17. An Irish blessing on a wall plaque in the Morris Inn at the University
of Notre Dame, November 7, 2007.
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There, the "turning of ankles" reinforces social norms of the
community from which the poem comes. In a sense, the physical
mark of punishment represented the visible rules of law, rules
which are now codified into the criminal law. Typically, we view
legal norms as specific to criminal law, and law that is backed up
with specific sanctions clearly related to the seriousness of
offense. But the high degree of consensus that once marked the
criminal was no longer in place by the time that industrialization
appeared in the nineteenth century. The factory began to segregate or compartmentalize individuals on a larger scale than was
the case in previous centuries. During these pre-modern times
there was less institutional segregation in the chronological life
course of individuals.
Historians and cultural theorists repeatedly emphasize that
over the course of the nineteenth century, modern societies
extended childhood into a period of time that would commonly
become known as adolescence. Society's need to do so can most
directly be attributed to the way most people living in industrialized cities were required to live. They needed to commute to a
place of work, and their workplaces required skills that could not
be easily duplicated without training or formal education. The
ability to know the technical skills required to succeed in an
industrial society demanded longer and more compulsory agesegregated forms of education."8
It is no accident in time that the beginnings of juvenile justice in the shape of America's first institutions for juveniles
appeared early in the nineteenth century. At about the same
time New York's House of Refuge was built for the treatment of
delinquents, the age period when youths were required to attend
public school was extended. This is the birth of adolescence in
age-segregated forms of compulsory schooling and its back-up
system of juvenile justice.
But it was not a simple factory but a complex factory that
required the extension of childhood, the creation of adolescence, compulsory schooling, and the beginnings ofjuvenile justice. There was complexity in the form of industrial modernity
with many divisions of labor. The assembly line illustrates the
divisions that would take place in moving raw materials into
desirable products. For those who believed in the promise of
18. Juvenile justice as it relates to the newly created category of adolescence is also related to the nineteenth-century requirements for extended periods of public schooling. A number of culturally sensitive reviews cite
adolescence as a distinct historical phenomenon. See, e.g.,JoN SAVAGE, TEENAGE:
THE CREATION OF YOUTH CULTURE 1 (2007).
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industrialization, the factory also exemplified the rational pursuit
of modern-day life.
Yet the modern industrial city not only became a source of
economic prosperity; it also became a source of impoverishment.
It created instability and newly desired needs in an increasingly
complex and divided world. No matter how historians and the
sociologists have commented on nineteenth-century industrial
modernity, the picture is virtually the same. It is a story of complexity and the instability of place. Individuals who were able to
escape poverty learned to adapt to modernity by leaving their
local and traditional sense of place. They moved and developed
the specialized skills that were required by an increasingly complex society.
This complex vision of society is emphasized in the scholarly
writings of distinguished nineteenth-century social theorists like
Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, and Karl Marx, who presented a
vision of industrial modernity.1 9 They all presented a vision of
modernity that was grounded in their emerging European industrial worlds. For Durkheim the sources of social control could be
found in the complexity in divisions of labor. These divisions, he
suggested, created the specialization that an industrial society
required to maximize its productivity. The unintended consequence of all this specialization produced the social alienation
that Marx repeatedly observed. The village and its traditional
marketplace was no longer to be observed for it would evaporate
into air.2" For Durkheim, the divisions led to his theory of anomie based on the fact that individuals were gradually more on
their own. Of particular concern was the expectation of living in
a world where the business was producing things that went
beyond the individual's basic needs. Society needed to regulate
desires in the wake of increasing affluence attributed to industrialization.2 1 The regulative view of modern-day life was also
observed by Weber in the conflicting organizations that
emerged, and the way that bureaucracies took on a complex life
of their own.2 2 The bureaucratic Weber saw complexity and con19. See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (George
Simpson trans., Free Press 1933) (1893) [hereinafter DURKHEIM, LABOR]; EMILE
DURKHEIM, SUICIDE (George Simpson ed., John A. Spaulding & George Simpson trans., Free Press 1951) (1897) [hereinafter DURKHEIM, SUICIDE]; MAX
WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim
Fischoff et al. trans., Bedminster Press 1968) (1922).
20. See KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO
(Washington Square Press 1964) (1848). When complaining about industrial
capitalism, Marx stated, "All that is solid melts into air." Id. at 6.
21. See DURKHEIM, LABOR, supra note 19.
22. See WEBER, supra note 19.
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flict as endemic to the desires of those manning government
offices and the desires of the public to know the reasons for all
those complex decisions. Following the German philosophers of
the time, industrial modernity and the promise of a highly rationalized world were treated with significant suspicion.
In relation to juvenile justice, systems of regulating the lives
of adolescents were beginning to come into place in the wake of
industrial modernity. The reasons for doing so are worth repeating. First, educational systems emerged to separate the place of
school from the place of family. The place of work was already
separated from the place of the family in an industrial society,
producing the age-segregated environment previously noted.
Second, the street corner became a significant place in the lives
of youths. The street corner was the localized village, but it was
one that consisted of youths. There was a place on not just one
corner but a multitude of corners. Corner boys could be distinguished from college boys, and in densely-populated inner cities
commentators began to note the problem of youth gangs and
the failure of city officials to control their emergence. 2' Third,
social institutions were needed to assist youths in their transition
from adolescence to adulthood. They were required so that
youths were not as much on their own. The school was the most
dominating institution.
Compulsory public school attendance required a back-up
sanction and an offense category. The regulation of truancy was
one of the missions of juvenile justice. It is not the only status
offense to emerge. Status offense categories that would lead to a
view of delinquent in a special children's part of criminal court
could be quite general. The category of ungovernable was
enough to set in motion the possibility of youths also finding
themselves in houses of refuge. Soon the option of houses of refuge, reformatories, or training schools looked less desirable. Officials advocated for alternatives, and the idea of probation also
became a system for regulating the lives of youths.
By the end of the nineteenth century there were too many
possibilities or systems of juvenile justice. There was rising concern about the many administrative categories and the legality of
these categories. According to officials at the time, a court of
jurisdiction was needed to make sense of reformatories, probation, social work, and mental health clinics. The juvenile court
became a "work in progress. 2 4 It was to be the unifying court of
jurisdiction to bring together systems of juvenile justice. In this
23.
24.

See, e.g., WILUIM FOOTE WHYrE, STREET CORNER SOCIETY (1955).
See generally TANENHAUS, supra note 1.
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sense it was regulative in the way that an industrial modernity was
in the business of regulating the factory, the city, public health,
child labor, and now delinquency and youth crime. The objects
of regulation were to create a more rational and ordered society-one that would be productive and efficient. The engine of
productivity could be observed in a well-ordered factory and a
well-designed city. It could also be obtained through public
health that would reduce the risks of disease, injury, and disaster.
The progressive agenda stayed focused on issues of safety by creating regulative courts and agencies. The juvenile court was just
one of many regulative courts that appeared on the list of progressive late-nineteenth-century reformers.
But for those who were well aware of the social psychology of
groups and the split between the regulative desires of a complex
society in the wake of a decline in a simple normative order,
there was a major paradox to be confronted that could not easily
be resolved then and today. The juvenile court to its critics simply extended the paradox in the form of a confidential nonadversarial civil court where the sole stated purpose was the best
interests of the child. Treatment, not punishment, as the object
of juvenile justice could not be maintained in the newly formed
juvenile court, because this kind of regulative view of delinquency conflicted with the normative force of law.
We can see the regulative force of the juvenile court in the
words of many of its early-twentieth-century advocates. Judge
Julian Mack questioned the justification for a newly created juvenile court:
Why is it not the duty of the state, instead of asking merely
whether a boy or a girl has committed a specific offense, to
find out what he is, physically, mentally, morally, and then
if he learns that he is treading the path that leads to criminality, to take him in charge, not so much to punish as to
reform, not to degrade but to uplift, not to crush but to
25
develop, not to make him a criminal but a worthy citizen.
Mack states simply the reason not only for a juvenile court but
also for a regulative view of juvenile justice. According to Mack,
the state should go beyond "asking merely whether a boy or a girl
has committed a specific offense." 26 The specific offense matters
little. The regulative function of the court is to move beyond
offense categories. To learn about the delinquent is to learn how
to prevent the delinquent from turning into an adult criminal.
Thus, the court performs a function that in theory alters the
25.
26.

Julian Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REv. 104, 107 (1910).
Id.
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pathways or structures in the life of troubled youths. To repeat,
the regulative view is one where offense matters little and is only
considered important as it reflects a particular pathway to
criminality.
Not only did the particular offense matter little in the progressive image of a traditional juvenile court, but the offense and
the offender were also not to be publicly observed. To turn a
delinquent into a worthy adult citizen required a veil of confidentiality. The juvenile's entrance into the juvenile court was to be
hidden to avoid the stigma of an arrest and a criminal conviction.
In this sense the juvenile court was an anonymous court, an
unobservable regulatory court, existing to identify deviance or
crime in the newly created category of delinquency.
For the early critics of the juvenile court, this confidential
regulatory court conflicted with the basic principle of normative
control. George Herbert Mead, the distinguished early-twentiethcentury social psychologist, feared that the juvenile court was an
experiment that might not work. The problem for Mead was that
it conflicted with the normative needs of society. He wrote it is
psychologically impossible "to hate the sin and love the sinner."27
To love the sinner appeared critical to the rehabilitative model
and to the regulative shape of the juvenile court. The question
that remained in Mead's mind was how the juvenile court
could
28
really condemn the sin without condemning the sinner.
Durkheim pushed the regulative envelope even further by
suggesting not only divisions of labor, but also the notion that
punishing the offender brings a society together. 29 For Durkheim this was not a simple act of defining normality. Recall the
point that society now was composed of many divisions of labor
in the industrial world that he observed in nineteenth-century
France. Instead, the normative had to be located within these
specialized worlds. The professions would create their own normative order, and seriousness would become relative. Law would
switch from a more repressive-visible-physical shape towards a
more restitutive, less-visible psychological form.
So Mead and Durkheim both knew that the normative was
important and could not nearly imagine how a regulatory form
ofjuvenile justice could ignore completely the normative force of
law, especially when it came to serious-offense categories. For the
normative shape of law to have any meaning in a regulative juve27. George H. Mead, The Psychology of PunitiveJustice, in THEORIES OF SOCIETY 876, 882 (one-vol. ed. 1965).
28. Id.
29. See DURKHEIM, LABOR, supra note 19.
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nile court, it was first important to distinguish categories of
offenses. The mixture of minor and major offenses, status and
non-status, into generalized acts of delinquency were for the purpose of focusing on the individual and not on the specific
offense, to repeat the point raised above by Judge Mack." ° But in
focusing on the offender and not the offense-to love the
offender and not to hate the sin-created not only the psychological conflict to which Mead alluded, but also an organizational
conflict with respect to the status of the offender. In the normative sense of law, the offender was important, and identification
of repeated offensive behavior was critical. It made little sense to
criminologists and the general public to ignore the prior-offense
history of the delinquent, for to ignore chronicity in offending
behavior is to ignore the predictive value of the past as a determinant of the future.
At this point it is important to consider complex organizational theory and how it may be relevant to understand the
inability of a juvenile court to merge the regulative and the normative. The first is organizational coupling. Complex organizations involve a multitude of decision makers all operating within
specific subsystems. The organizational model of an industrial
modernity was that of a machine. This is reflected in the timemanagement theories of Federick Taylor, who produced a discipline of organizational behavior that is referred to as Taylorism.3 1 The basic assumption is that people can be treated as if
they were machines, studied for their ability to conform to specific tasks on an assembly line, and then worked in a way that
would produce maximum efficiency. The trouble with this
tightly-coupled view of organizational behavior is that it
neglected the human or emotional element that was involved in
people's labor. People on an assembly line are unlikely to be able
to perfectly synchronize their mental states. Indeed, as critics of
Taylorism have noted, demands of such conformity literally
drove workers nuts.
Yet the case for a tightly-coupled system can be made based
on the words of the early juvenile court judges that populated
the newly created juvenile courts. They were not only reformers,
but also charismatic individuals who David Rothman referred to
as creating a "cult of judicial personality. '32 It was a tightly-cou30.
31.
22-26.
32.

See supra text accompanying note 25.
For an excellent review of Taylorism, see

MORGAN,

supra note 11, at

See DAVIDJ. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE (1980) (providing an excellent historical review ofjuvenile court judges and introduction the
"cult of judicial personality" as a term).
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pled view of the juvenile justice system as one that allowed a single official in the form of a juvenile court judge to understand,
observe, track, and maintain both the treatment and punishment
objectives of the court. I will not repeat the Judge Ben Lindsey
stories, such as his weekly visits to reformatories to check on the
treatment of the juveniles that he placed there. Rather, I will simply state that a reading of Lindsey's view ofjuvenile justice is one
that was dedicated to not only understanding the youths who
entered his courts but also to maintaining control over official
decision making.
Thus the cult ofjudicial personality produced tight coupling
to the extent that Lindsey was his own probation officer. Judge
Mack saw Lindsey's approach to juvenile justice as naive and not
easily reproduced. He was well aware of the ability of Lindsey to
act in a way that went beyond the courtroom. Mack stated that
Lindsey's tactics could not be duplicated because his work
depended too much on personality and not enough on organizational structure. Mack stated:
Judge Lindsey cannot be imitated, because his work
depends upon his personality .... His real greatness is his

work as his own chief probation officer. Now, if a judge
happens to be fitted by nature to be the chief probation
officer in his community, and if his community is of a size
that he can combine the work of the judge and chief probation officer, that community is fortunate. But the lines of
our work should not be laid out on the basis that we are
going to find that unique personality in any of our
communities."3
The problem for Judge Mack and advocates of a more bureaucratically-attuned juvenile court is that there are too few "personalities" to fill the role of a super parent.
Both Mack and Lindsey were correct in their ideal vision of a
juvenile court. But rather than think of Lindsey merely as a personality, we might view him in organizational terms as a leader.
The juvenile court judge in a sense is a chief executive officer.
Judges in the regulative court for juveniles are to lead,not to be
managed. However, the literature on judicial decision making is
one that emphasizes the role of the juvenile court judge as one
that is managed. Decisions are often already made for the judge
by the time a case is to be heard. Instead ofjuvenile court judges

33.

ROBERT M. MENNEL, THORNS AND THISTLES 138-39 (1973).
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managing, they are managed.34 This is not leadership in the
organizational sense of the word.
The term "cult of judicial personality" is too easily dismissive
of Lindsey's attempt to create a tightly coupled system ofjuvenile
justice. It ignores the fact that he was transparent about his ability to decide the status of youths. Lindsey did not hesitate to
respond to both regulative and normative concerns. He was willing to use the hard-end of the system in the form of exclusionary
controls. But he was able to draw on inclusionary forms of control through the use of probation. The critical ingredient for
Lindsey was not only maintaining tight coupling in its organizational objectives but also attaining transparency in observing and
reporting the actions of officials.
Yet for juvenile courts that were not as tightly coupled
around the regulative and normative objectives as Judge Lindsey's court was, a loosening of goals emerged and the stated best
interests of juveniles conflicted with principles of justice. Based
on his observations of juvenile justice and a theory of delinquency, David Matza produced one of the most cited sweeping
critiques of juvenile justice in general and the juvenile court in
particular. In the first part of his 1964 book, Delinquency and Drift,
Matza reviewed subcultural theories of delinquency and suggested, as I have at the beginning of this article, they were too
singular in their normative approach. 35 They emphasized too
much delinquency and neglected to explain why everyone in subcultural groups failed to become delinquent. He repeated the
standard argument of control theorists, stating that only a small
proportion of youths become seriously delinquent. Nonetheless,
he departed from control theorists to suggest also that there was
not one singular group controlling the lives of adolescents in a
modern society.
Matza presented a more dynamic view of delinquency and
control. He rejected the static normative conception of control.
He repeated the standard critique of a sociology that was structured around a normative conception of group or an over-socialized conception of human behavior. For Matza there was validity
to an ongoing regulative view of life that took into account a multitude of meanings and ways of interpreting behavior deemed as
deviant, delinquent, and even criminal. In presenting a dynamic
34. John Hagan, The Social and Legal Constructionof CriminalJustice:A Study
of the Pre-SentencingProcess, 22 Soc. PROBS. 620 (1975).
35. Matza's book is one of the most highly cited books in criminology. It
has surely had influence on my own work and, I believe, the work of Professor
Barry Feld. See DAVID MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFr (1964).
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conception of delinquency, he agreed with labeling theorists that
a lot of delinquency was episodic, trivial, and of little consequence. Delinquency turned serious when the juveniles were
identified repeatedly as delinquents and isolated by a system of
justice that was perceived to be exclusionary and unfair. 6
For Matza what is normative in the adult world was not necessarily normative in the social world of adolescents. Delinquency
was more or less public and common in the world of adolescents,
particularly in the form of status offenses, such as possessing alcohol or skipping school. There was a risk in punishing youths as
delinquents for these common acts of delinquency3 7because they
generally desisted, if not identified, as delinquent.
The risk of identifying juveniles as delinquent for Matza was
the same as if they were identified as criminal. But juveniles had
more to draw on in sensing legal injustice. In particular, they
expected juvenile justice and they received criminal justice.
Delinquents saw little in the way of individualized justice, and
more in the way of offense-based justice. This adult principle of
offense-based justice clearly operated in the criminal court, it
emphasized a relationship between the severity of punishment
and the severity of crime, and it also operated in the juvenile
court. The difference is that while the criminal court was explicit
about this normative function, the juvenile court was not.3 8
Matza further suggested that a delinquent subculture would
emerge for a small segment of disgruntled and labeled youths.
They would become committed to their deviant values and the
norms because the juvenile court failed to provide them with a
sense of justice. Delinquents in this serious category were at risk
of becoming chronic adult offenders. For these delinquent
youths, the sense of legal injustice that is perpetrated by a loosely
coupled juvenile justice system leads them to become serious
delinquents.3 9
The sense of legal injustice may be viewed as reflecting the
basic conflict between the regulative and normative forces of law.
In the terms Matza draws on, it is the conflict between the principle of individualized justice and the principle of offense. The
normative is clearly in the principle of offense-the seriousness
of the offense is critical to the election of criminal as well as juvenile court judges and to the idea of protecting the community.
The juvenile court may state that it is in the business of treatment
36.

Id.

37.

Id.

38.
39.

Id.
Id.
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or pursuing the best interests of the juvenile, but in reality, it
must respond to normative concerns, which means addressing
the seriousness of the offense. The juvenile who expects individualized justice but receives instead the offense-based retributive
objectives of a juvenile court is at risk of becoming a serious
delinquent.
Matza further states a set of doctrines that qualify the principles of offense and individualized justice. These doctrines are
able to be invoked by juvenile justice officials to modify the decision making that leads to a wide range of possible dispositions.
The first doctrine is straightforward control-the doctrine of
parental sponsorship. Juvenile court judges will readily admit to
this one, noting that parents make a difference in the way they
decide a case. If the judge knows the juvenile has caring parents
or adults who are willing to look after the alleged delinquent and
keep the youth on a straight and narrow path, the judge is less
inclined to incarcerate the youth.4 °
The second doctrine Matza calls the doctrine of residential
space. Here, Matza is notjust discussing space in existing prisons.
Rather, residential space relates to the old adage, "You build
them. We will fill them." This is purely organizational justice by
geography based on capacities in the stated administration ofjustice. It is specific to particular systems within a larger, broader
concept of administering justice given the availablity of limited
resources. While juvenile court officials will attempt to deny it,
when pressed with the data, they will often acknowledge that
organizational capacity makes a difference. A serious offense may
or may not lead to incarceration based on the capacity of institutions to provide delinquents with residential space. 4 '
The sense of injustice that can emerge from these conflicting principles and doctrines can make a bad situation even
worse. This is where Matza's critique is most devastating, for it
suggests that the juvenile court is too loose, too conflicting in its
organizational mission, and neither regulative nor normative in
its ability to control and prevent serious delinquency. Matza was
not alone in his critique. An emerging chorus of critics emerged
in the sixties to complain about the rehabilitative ideal and the
ability of the state to decide the best interests of its youth in a
confidential court of jurisdiction. The concern was not only with
a loosening of principles, purposes, and system of juvenile justice, but also with a vast non-visible bureaucratic juvenile court.
40.
41.

Id.
Id.
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A new generation of child-savers first wished for the determination of justice in an adversarial process that could determine
the truth about the alleged delinquent behavior. They wished for
both the normative and the regulative.
II.

LATE MODERNITY AND THE CONTEMPORARY
JUVENILE COURT: WHAT IS

IT?

Matza's critique overlapped with the critique of scholars who
viewed the court's confidential, non-adversarial procedures as
creating what the U.S. Supreme Court would later view as neither
providing justice nor the solicitous care promised by its reformers. In a series of due-process oriented decisions that first
appeared in Kent v. United States and then continued with In re
Gault, a majority of court members viewed delinquents as receiving the worst of both worlds.
The due process revolution that would occur for juvenile
court can first be traced to Kent. In Kent, a chronically violent
youth was transferred by ajuvenile court judge to criminal court
without a hearing. The U.S. Supreme Court, in its first case of
juvenile justice, wrote, "There is evidence, in fact, that there may
be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both
worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults
nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for
children."4 2 In other words, the juvenile court failed to meet its
normative and regulative functions. The evidence was theoretically strong based on the impressions ofjuvenile court critics, but
empirically weak. It was a blanket condemnation of juvenile justice, and it was one based on a theory of justice that was normatively grounded in the need to see the offender punished.
Although the Supreme Court's condemnation of a traditional juvenile court stopped short of fully advocating adult due
process rights forjuveniles by later rejecting the right to a trial by
jury and protection against preventive detention, it did provide a
semblance of justice through an adversarial process that guaranteed youth threatened with incarceration the right to legal representation. In seeking the "best" of both worlds in the standard
formula for due process, the Supreme Court wished to emphasize the normative. Standards of justice were emphasized, but
within a juvenile court. In advocating the best of both worlds, the
regulative aspects of the court could become secondary to the
normative. In other words, through a mix of normative and regulative, the Supreme Court wished to have it both ways-treat42.

Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
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ment and punishment, inclusion and exclusion, regulative and
normative forms of justice.
Not only would a more complicated form of justice emerge,
also
one that suffered from the obfuscating effects of too
but
many systems. Each of these systems could be allowed to exist for
reasons that go beyond the principles and doctrines that Matza
initially suggested. The "systems approach" mushroomed into a
multitude of legal and administrative avenues. Criminalization
became just one direction for the technically more serious and
violent offenders. The mixing of regulative and normative missions created opportunities for many juveniles to enter one system for reasons that had little to do with individualized justice or
the principle of offense. Organizational capacities expanded
beyond just residential availability.
In a series of articles on the impact of criminalization, Professor Barry Feld has pointed repeatedly to its unintended consequences in producing justice by geography and in increasing
racial disparities.' 3 The impact of a criminalized juvenile court is
to increase the proportion of minority youth who are subject to
hard-end systems of justice. The threat of minority youth may
have always been there, but criminalization provided a new avenue for creating a system of more intrusive forms of control. This
was not clearly possible in a hidden system of juvenile justice. It
was possible in a public criminal court where the violent juvenile
offender could be seen, counted, and tracked. Criminalization
satisfied societal demands to do something aboutjuvenile crime.
But doing something was specific to those urbanized areas where
there was a heightened concern about impoverished minority
youths who were viewed as largely responsible for serious violent
crime. 4 4
Criminalization could have been anticipated in a juvenile
court that could not maintain its regulative mission. At the softend of the juvenile justice system, the President's crime commission advocated the diversion of status offenders. Diversion would
make the stigma of a delinquent classification in juvenile court of
less consequence. It was a way to take seriously the arguments of
43.
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labeling theorists and to advocate at the soft-end ways of avoiding
juvenile justice in a singularly administered regulative court.
Many scholars have written about the intended and unintended consequences of diversion from juvenile court. The separation of status offenders from the rest of the delinquent
population would create more than one category of delinquent.
It was the beginning of bifurcating post-industrial systems of justice. Donald Cressey and Robert McDermott were particularly
insightful when they reviewed the emerging diversionary literature and concluded,
[T]here will be a polarization of attitudes and programs:
Lawbreaking juveniles are likely to be processed along the
lines of the adult model and hence will receive more due
process and less humanistic consideration; after all, are
they not merely small criminals? Juveniles who have been
called "predelinquents," because they can't get along at
home or in school, will be diverted.4 5
This kind of bifurcation in the legal process of delinquents and
predelinquents is just one kind of classification. Many more
would appear with states producing a diversity of categories, legal
labels, and administrative as well as legal avenues for producing
juvenile justice. Newly derived legal terms to describe the traditional all-encompassing category of delinquent would include,
juvenile offender, restrictive juvenile delinquent, person-in-need
of supervision, youthful offender, and so forth. Each of these
terms would follow its own system of regulative or normative justice. They would further loosen the juvenile court from its original overarching mission to provide the coordinated care that
adolescents in a complex society needed to move from their
dependent status.
It is important to consider how the late-modern vision of
juvenile justice might be viewed in a slightly different light from
that of the industrial modernity of the past. Principles of offense
and individualized justice would need to be revised to take into
account structural shifts in the post-industrial modern world. It is
not enough to state simply that the modern world is more complex. Rather it is just as important to consider how complexity in
a late modern world is related to the social structure of contemporary adolescence.
The first observation is that the late-modern world of adolescence is a less grounded place. It is one where there is increased
suburbanization. It is one where there are fewer street-corners
45. Donald Cressey & Robert A. McDermott, Diversionfrom the JuvenileJustice System, in NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF JUVENILE CORRECTIONS 61 (1972).
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and less of the youth population that can be observed as simply
hanging out. Rather the complexity of place is compounded by
newly created, fast-moving technologies. The internet has
become the new street-corner for many youths. Instant messaging, MySpace, and Facebook produce virtual communities. They
are easily observable and create mechanisms of control that previously did not exist.
All this technology, however, is not for everyone. It is for
those who are affluent enough to afford a personal computer
and to live in a suburban development. The large proportion of
non-impoverished youths who today have access to computers
reflects the affluence of a society where there are expectations of
living in a larger, globalized world. Within this larger world of
modern-day affluence, there are pockets of poverty and these are
often located where we began our review: in the impoverished
inner city. It is disorganized, and just as much a zone of transition today as it was a hundred years ago when Chicago school
sociologists first identified its existence. 46 It is still considered a
dangerous place-an area where violent gang activity thrives and
an area to be contained by the residents of the larger metropolitan area.
Thus the bifurcating mechanisms of control in the late modern world has produced two kinds ofjuvenile justice. The first in
the form of control as it relates to impoverished youths in the
impoverished inner city. This is clearly normative. The boundaries are marked and reinforced by the way that newly derived
strategies of control draw on the hard-end ofjuvenile justice. The
second is control as it relates to affluent youths in the affluent
suburban city. This is regulative. Here the boundaries are
marked by a wealth of resources that create a vast soft-end system
of juvenile justice. This includes private therapy and the private
insurance to pay for the troubling behaviors of affluent youths.
But the affluent suburban city also includes plenty of diversionary programs; the schools function with diversion in mind, in the
form of treatment and support for those who deviate from the
norm. It is purely regulative and non-normative. If anything
there is a bit of self-actualization in the affluent suburban city
where a certain degree of deviance is considered normal, acceptable, and part of what it means to be an adolescent.
Today the late-modern future of the contemporary juvenile
court is a precarious one for failing to make explicit in a single
court of jurisdiction its regulative and normative functions. The
46. CLIFFORD R. SHAw & HENRY D. McKAY, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
URBAN AREAs (1942).
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late modern world has allowed juvenile justice to proceed in the
United States based on categories of affluence. These categories
of affluence will continue to see criminal justice as appropriate
for a segment of delinquents charged with acts of violence, the
normative principle of offense will continue to be invoked.
Although Roper v. Simmons emphasized the fact that no other
modern developed country imposes the death penalty on its
youth, it also supported the possibility of life without parole for
those juveniles who could not be executed.4 7 Although it also
pointed to psychological evidence that youths lack the maturity
of adults, it affirmed the criminal court as an appropriate court
of jurisdiction. It is also important to bear in mind that the
Supreme Court could have included sociological data showing
the increasing dependence of older adolescents and young
adults on their parents, thus supporting the notion that the age
of onset for adult responsibilities is becoming even longer in
today's late-modern world. In other words, the Supreme Court
refused to consider the late-nineteenth-century idea that
juveniles were deserving of a separate and exclusive system of
juvenile justice.
Thus the late-modern future is one that may continue to
blur the lines ofjuvenile justice. It may continue to be normative
for a segment of juveniles that is viewed as criminal and regulative for another segment that is viewed as predelinquent. This
classification may continue to be debated without a clear vision
of the alternatives.
But we can also expect in a future set of court and legislative
decisions repeal of waiver laws that punish relatively young
juveniles with adult kinds of punishment. The same logic
expressed by the Supreme Court in Roper may be expressed when
it comes to life in prison without the possibility of parole. According to a recent New York Times front page story, seventy-three
offenders in nineteen states are currently serving life sentences
without the possibility of parole for crimes they committed prior
to their sixteenth birthday.4" If we move to the next category and
include juveniles below the age of eighteen, Amnesty International reports 2225 offenders currently serving sentences of life
without the possibility of parole.4 9 The number of juveniles sentenced to life with the possibility of parole represents only a small
47.
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segment of juveniles who are convicted in criminal court. 50 This
vision of criminal justice will continue forjuveniles unless there is
a vision of regulative and normative control in the juvenile court.
It is a vision that must take into account the theory of complex
organizations and the fact that juvenile justice systems are bifurcating in a post-industrial world.
III.

THE LATE MODERN FUTURE OF A

CONTEMPORARY SWITCH-HIITING JUVENILE COURT:

WHEN WILL WE KNOW IF IT HAS ARRIVED?

The late-modern future of the contemporary juvenile justice
system should not simply be viewed as expanding the vision of a
late-nineteenth-century juvenile court. The need for a juvenile
court remains the same. Despite calls for its abolishment, no
American state or modern nation-state has eliminated its juvenile
courts. The juvenile court will remain as long as states of social
dependency continue as they have from childhood into adulthood. It will also remain as the only possible coordinating court
of legal jurisdiction for troubled youths. The juvenile court has
the legal authority that no other institution has to provide both
the regulative safety and normative controls that are seen as in
the best interests of society.
But at the same time that juvenile court is recognized as a
critical legal institution, its failure to have a theory of complex
organizations should be considered. The first aspect of a theory
is to recognize its suggestive possibilities. Social theories are not
deterministic theories; they are probabilistic and may be viewed
for their heuristic value in making it possible to see the less visible in a complex organizational setting. This is particularly the
case, as I have argued, when it comes to juvenile justice. At this
point I wish to draw on the organizational literature to suggest
the importance of classification, tight-coupling, and community.
The regulative view of complexity is to reduce it by a system
of classification. It is one that cannot simply be defined in terms
of good and evil. Rather it is relational and acknowledges the fact
that individuals are not all endowed equally with the same set of
abilities and desires. The troubling behaviors of youths who are
deemed delinquent need to be understood in a system of classification that is not for the purpose of exclusion but for the purpose of inclusion. Here I have in mind the language of
disabilities and the possibility that anyone may be disabled due to
an accident or illness. The desire is to identify the disability for
50.
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the purpose of enabling the individual to be a fully participating
member of society.
Tight-coupling is a way of coordinating loosely coupled systems. 5 It should be balanced with the need for an adversarial
process that acknowledges the possibility that to do otherwise is
to risk a sense of injustice. Perceived fairness in any social system
or social institution is critical to the legitimacy of that institution.
Consistency and fairness in response to the particulars is seen as
critical to good parenting. It cannot exist without an acknowledgement of authority; although that authority cannot fall into
the camp of authoritarian control at least in a modern democratic society. The authoritative rule of law fits with the regulative
and normative visions of control; you can see it and debate it in a
way that makes sense to all of its participants.
The third aspect of complex organizational theory is that of
community. But it is not community in traditional, old fashioned
sense of the word-a place that is associated with a tightly-knit
group of individuals. It is hardly normative as it is used in the
organizational literature. It has been advocated as a way of making organizations more effective and consistent in their tasks.
Community is identified when considering the work groups that
scholars in the analysis of legal decision making have repeatedly
identified. This kind of community may be viewed as fleeting, but
when set in terms of specific goals it is seen as critical to getting
the job done.5 2
A switch-hitting juvenile court will arrive when officials are
able to identify the systems of classification, tight-coupling, and
community in juvenile justice. I will conclude with three more
ingredients that, in my mind, would reinvigorate the possibilities
for a regulative and normative juvenile court. The first ingredient is the concept of visibility. The juvenile justice system should
be a visible system while protecting the confidentiality of its
youth. Official decision making and various treatments and punishments should be subject to review. In the wake of organizational complexity and the risk of classifying youths in a way that
incorrectly excludes, visibility is critical to a switch-hitting juvenile court.
51. This point has been repeatedly highlighted in the distinguished
scholarly writings of John Hagan. See, e.g., John Hagan, Why Is There So Little
CriminalJustice Theory? Neglected Macro- and Micro-Level Links Between Organization
and Power, 26J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 116, 129 (1989).
52. For a view of how working groups of officials in criminal courts act as
communities, see JAMES EISENSTEIN ET AL., THE CONTOURS OFJUSTICE: COMMUNITIES AND THEIR COURTS (1988).
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The second ingredient is the concept of resorts. A switchhitting juvenile court needs to make visible its first, second, and
tertiary resorts. The continuum of resorts and possibilities must
be explicit if the shape of juvenile justice is to be identified. For
certain regulative purposes, a longer spectrum of first and last
resort responses would seem appropriate. For certain normative
functions, the available sanctions may be more limited. Resorts
may also be associated with age providing the youth discount that
Professor Barry Feld has advocated.5 3
The third ingredient is the idea of leadership. The switchhitting juvenile court will look to how complex organizations
have moved beyond the mere principle of management to suggest principles of leadership. An effective organization is not one
where supervisors merely manage through the control of its
employees but one where supervisors are able to lead. This principle of leadership makes the most sense when dealing with professionals who are in the business of trying to provide innovative
solutions. There is little that could be more innovative than confronting the troubling behavior of youths.5 4
By making the juvenile court the coordinating court ofjurisdiction, I have suggested that the late-modern system of juvenile
justice will be one where its regulatory mission is not at odds with
normative concerns. This again requires leadership to assure visibility in classification, tight-coupling in organizational response,
and community in the unifying objectives of juvenile justice
officials.
CONCLUSION: WHAT HAS YET TO BE SAID
ABOUT A SWITCH-HITTING JUVENILE COURT

It is too easy to be critical, and my suggestions for switchhitting juvenile court may be viewed as quite sparse. First, we
need to know more about the normative and regulative functions
in a society where classification is often found to be related to
states of affluence as they often are related to class and race. The
status of minority and majority youths in the juvenile and criminal justice system cannot be separated from issues of poverty.
The impoverished inner city remains as the reason for a hard53. The seminal articles on the social and organization construction of
first and last resorts are in the scholarly writings of Robert Emerson. See Robert
M. Emerson, Case Processing and InterorganizationalKnowledge, 38 Soc. PROBS. 198
(1991); Robert M. Emerson, Holistic Effects in Social Control Decision-Making, 17
LAw & Soc'v REx,. 425 (1983); Robert M. Emerson, On Last Resorts, 87 Am. J.
Soc. 1 (1981).
54. The distinction I make between leadership and management draws
on BOLMAN & DEAL, supra note 11, at 309-446.
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end juvenile justice system. The affluent suburban city is the justification for a soft-end system of juvenile justice. A late-modern
switch-hitting juvenile court will be difficult to implement if this
division between the affluent and non-affluent worlds of juvenile
justice cannot be reduced.
A second late-modern issue that I have only touched upon is
the extended dependency of youth into adulthood. Sociologists
have noted this to be the case as more youth are spending more
time in school, delaying marriage and work even further. When
they are working, they expect to be less set in their careers, and
more likely to switch from one place of employment to the next.
We would expectjuvenile justice to extend to this new, older age
category of extended adolescence based on their economic and
psychological states of dependency. But that is not the case based
on the fact that ages of criminal responsibility have been
reduced, not increased.
My last point relates to the limitation of theorizing about
certain basic facts. The facts that I have drawn on come from my
own research on the expanding nature of criminal justice for
juveniles5" and from Roper. The other facts are the expanding
number of soft-end diversions. But there may be examples of
switch-hitting juvenile courts which suggest that all is not so
wrong with the state of juvenile justice. My feeling is that the
switch-hitting juvenile court is already there in the affluent suburban city. This is a post-modern place where the resources that
can be spent on youths far exceed the amount spent on impoverished inner city youths. Empirical research is required to see how
both a regulative and normative court operates in some places
more than in others.
In either case, my attempt at theorizing about the possibility
of a switch-hitting juvenile court is for the purpose of making the
juvenile court into the kind of legal setting that would be in the
best interests of a society that wishes to reduce delinquency and
crime. It is not an easy road to follow. But to continue to go
along a path of defining a segment of juveniles as adults when
they clearly are not risks perpetuating bureaucratic complexity or
systems ofjuvenile justice. The alternative road to juvenile justice
as I have tried to repeatedly suggest is for a more transparent,
organized, and orderly system of juvenile justice that is rooted in
a late-modern vision for a switch-hitting juvenile court.

55.

See

SINGER,

supra note 44.

